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Does attracting or losing jobs in high paying sectors have important spill-over effects on wages in
other sectors? The answer to this question is central to a proper assessment of many trade and industrial
policies. In this paper, we explore this question by examining how predictable changes in industrial
composition in favor of high paying sectors affect wage determination at the industry-city level. In
particular, we use US Census data over the years 1970 to 2000 to quantify the relationship between
changes in industry-specific city-level wages and changes in industrial composition.  Our finding is
that the spill-over (i.e., general equilibrium) effects associated with changes in the fraction of jobs
in high paying sectors are very substantial and persistent. Our point estimates indicate that the total
effect on average wages of a change in industrial composition that favors high paying sectors is about
3.5 times greater than that obtained from a commonly used composition-adjustment approach which
neglects general equilibrium effects. We interpret our results as being most likely driven by a variant
of the mechanism recently emphasized in the heterogenous firm literature whereby changes in competitive
pressure cause a reallocation of employment toward the most efficient firms.
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In popular discussion about labor market developments, whether it be at the national or
international level, changes in the nature of jobs are often given a pre-eminent role. In
particular, it is often claimed that labor market performance hinges on whether an economy
is attracting or losing “good jobs”: jobs in industries which pay a premium relative to wages
for similarly qualiﬁed workers in other industries. For example, in Bluestone and Harrison’s
highly cited 1982 book, The Deindustrialization of America, the authors argued that the
loss of highly paid manufacturing jobs was key to understanding the poor labor market
performance of the US economy during the 1970s and 1980s. However, based on simple
accounting exercises aimed at assessing the potential importance of changes in industrial
composition on average wages, most serious economic researchers now dismiss such views as
being ill-informed.
The accounting approach used to dispel the Bluestone-Harrison [1982] view consists of me-
chanically computing the fraction of a wage change that can be directly attributed to the
loss or gain of employment in high versus low wage paying industries. The result from such
exercises almost always indicates that the wage change directly accounted for by changes
in sectoral composition of employment is small. This accounting approach has seen wide-
spread use in the profession since it is easy to implement and it is theoretically defensible.
Notwithstanding these attractive features, the starting point of this paper is a questioning
of the validity of this approach.
The accounting approach hinges critically on the assumption that a change in employment
opportunities in one sector does not aﬀect the wages paid in other sectors, i.e., that there
are no general equilibrium eﬀects from shifts in industrial composition. Because of this as-
sumption, the impact of a shift in industrial composition can be computed mechanically by
multiplying industry- speciﬁc wage premia by changes in the share of employment in corre-
sponding industries. Without the assumption, one would also have to account for changes
in the wage premia arising from the compositional shifts, destroying the clean break into
“within” (premia change) and “between” (composition change) components that is a key
feature of the accounting approach. There are many ways to justify the no-GE eﬀects as-
sumption, which is part of the appeal of this approach. The easiest defence is to note that
if wages are simply a function of productivity and returns to labour are close to constant,
one just needs to assume that changes in industrial composition do not change productivity
within sectors to arrive at the conclusion that there are no GE eﬀects. The latter assumption
2might be viewed as innocuous by many economists, but it is the one we want to place into
question. In particular, there is now a substantive and growing literature – mainly developed
in the context of international trade – which suggests that average productivity in a sector is
potentially endogenous to the competitive environment and, accordingly, responds to outside
forces. For example, Melitz [2003] and Bernard, Eaton, Kortum and Jensen [2003] show how
the opening up of trade can cause sectoral productivity to increase by forcing ineﬃcient ﬁrms
to exit, resulting in a reallocation of production towards more productive ﬁrms. Although
these ideas have not yet played a large role in the labor literature, they appear very relevant.
Speciﬁcally, if international trade can have important general equilibrium eﬀects on produc-
tivity then it follows that changes in industrial composition may have important eﬀects on
sectoral level wages (to the extent that wages are generally related to productivity).
The object of this paper is to examine whether changes in sectoral composition of employ-
ment, especially shifts in composition between high paying sectors and low paying sectors,
have important general equilibrium eﬀects on the determination of within sector wages. To
address this question, we ﬁrst present a simple theory that demonstrates how a change in
industrial composition, through its eﬀect on the bargaining environment, can aﬀect wages in
sectors not directly involved in the compositional change. In such sectors, we argue that an
improved outside option for workers will place upward pressure on wages, forcing ineﬃcient
ﬁrms to exit the market and thereby favoring a reallocation of employment toward more pro-
ductive ﬁrms. Since workers manage to appropriate part of the gain in average productivity
through the bargaining process, their wages increase. This mechanism echoes closely that
discussed in the recent heterogenous ﬁrm trade literature. However, in much of the related
trade literature, wages are treated as exogenous, while our focus is on implications for wages.
The model we present is one with substantial frictions. In particular, we adopt a random
matching set up in the labor market to allow ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities to co-exist
in a market; an occurrence for which there is substantial corroborating evidence. Although
the model is very stylized, and must be interpreted as such, it provides a concise illustration
of how changes in industrial composition could have important spill-over eﬀects that would
be missed by adopting an accounting approach. Moreover, the model clearly illustrates how
a change in industrial composition in a small sub-set of sectors has the potential to aﬀect
wages across the entire range of industries.
In order to examine the relevance of spill-over eﬀects associated with changes in the fraction of
jobs that are “good jobs”, we exploit geographical variation in industrial composition across
3US cities over the period 1970-2000. More speciﬁcally, we exploit the fact that aggregate
changes in US industrial composition have not been evenly distributed across US cities. Our
approach is to look at whether wages paid in a given industry systematically diﬀer across
cities depending on the distribution of employment across the other industries in the city
and, in particular, whether wages paid in any given industry tend to be higher in a city
which has an industrial composition that is more concentrated toward high paying jobs. To
do this, we examine 10 and 20 year changes in industry × city level wages using data from
the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses for 152 cities.1 Our key covariate is the change
in the weighted average industrial wage premium in the given city, where the weights are
local employment shares for each industry and the industrial wage premia are national level
premia estimated holding education, experience, race and gender constant. This variable will
increase in value if the industrial composition of employment in a city shifts toward higher
premia industries. Working in diﬀerences in this way allows us to control for general industry
× city ﬁxed eﬀects, and we also include a full set of industry dummy variables, eﬀectively
allowing national industrial premia to diﬀer over time. Given this estimation framework,
we are working with within-industry variation in wages. If the null hypothesis that there
are no GE eﬀects from composition shifts (and, thus, that a mechanical decomposition
provides a theoretically appropriate measure) is true then our key covariate, which reﬂects
changes in industrial composition, should have a coeﬃcient of zero in our regressions: wages
within industries should not change in response to local changes in composition. Under the
alternative we consider in our theoretical model, this covariate should have a positive sign.
We address potential endogeneity concerns with the average industrial premium variable by
using an instrumenting strategy in which we predict changes in local industrial employment
shares using a combination of initial local shares and changes in employment shares at the
national level. Thus, we eﬀectively examine the impact of national level industrial shifts
(arising, perhaps, due to preference or trade shocks) on local wages, where we apportion the
impact of the national shifts to localities based on which cities were most heavily concentrated
in the large shift industries before the shifts occurred. We also devote considerable eﬀort at
addressing the possible non-random selection in unobservable worker characteristics across
cities using the method proposed in Dahl [2002].
1 There are both advantages and disadvantages of using city level observations to examine this issue.
On the one hand, an attractive feature is there are over 150 metropolitan areas in the US which gives us
a sample with many diﬀerent patterns of industrial composition. On the other, if labor markets across US
cities are all perfectly integrated, then we could ﬁnd no spill-over even if such eﬀects exist at the national
level. In this sense, this study may a priori be seen as biased toward ﬁnding small or no general equilibrium
eﬀects of industrial composition even if they are present.
4The main empirical result of the paper is that city level changes in industrial composition
induced by national level changes in demand patterns have eﬀects on wages that are 3 to 3.5
times greater than what would be predicted by a pure accounting approach. It is important to
keep in mind when considering this result that measured composition eﬀects are often small.
Thus, for example, even the seemingly large event of a city losing an industry that employed
10% of the workforce and paid a premium of 20% relative to other industries (roughly the
situation facing Pittsburgh with the loss of the steel industry in the 1980s) implies only a
2% drop in the average wage using the pure accounting approach. Our result says that the
total impact on city average wages would be a 6 to 7% decline: a large, though not extreme,
eﬀect. Impacts of this size have the potential to place back on the table explanations for
changes in the wage structure that may operate through changes in industrial structure and
which have largely been discounted because the pure accounting measures of their impacts
are relatively small (e.g., Bound and Johnson [1992]).
Having identiﬁed a substantial spillover eﬀect of changes in industrial composition on the
wage structure, we attempt to narrow down the range of potential explanations for what is
driving it. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of composition is present over long (20 year) horizons and
is present in wages in both the tradeable and non-tradeable goods sectors. We argue that
these results do not ﬁt with models in which the composition eﬀect reﬂects spill-overs into
the non-tradeable sector or ones in which workers are simply taking rents from quasi-ﬁxed
factors. What remains is induced productivity changes in all sectors of the type illustrated in
our theoretical model. Thus, we interpret these results as supporting the idea that changes in
workers’ outside options may have important eﬀects on rationalization of production within
an industry.2
It is important to emphasize that we are interested in longer term diﬀerences in wage struc-
ture associated with diﬀerent industrial composition as opposed to short run adjustments
to industrial change. Phrased in terms of a concrete example, Pittsburgh suﬀered from the
loss of jobs in the steel sector with high unemployment in the immediate aftermath of those
losses. In the longer run, though, Pittsburgh’s unemployment rate has declined to levels be-
low the national average and it has emerged with a new industrial composition [Briem 2002].
We are interested in the impact on Pittsburgh’s wage structure of the long term shift in its
industrial structure rather than the short run wage eﬀects occurring as the direct aftermath
2 While it may be possible to examine the implications of our model using productivity data, as opposed
to wage data, there are tradeoﬀs. In particular, it is very diﬃcult to create measures of sectoral productivity
that properly control for human capital diﬀerences. For this reason, and others, we believe that focusing on
wages implications is more desirable.
5of the closing of the steel mills. Thus, our focus is diﬀerent from, for example, that in Green-
stone and Moretti [2003] or Blanchard and Katz [1992]. While Greenstone and Moretti focus
mainly on local real estate price and same-industry wage bill eﬀects within three years of
acquiring a large plant, emphasizing shorter run demand eﬀects, we focus on changes arising
over 10 to 20 year horizons and are investigating whether there are wage eﬀects of changes
in industrial composition holding direct demand eﬀects, or in other words the size of the
city, constant. This focus also diﬀerentiates our work from studies of regional adjustment to
demand changes such as in Blanchard and Katz [1992]. In order to clarify this diﬀerence, we
take care in our empirical work to control for the types of demand eﬀects examined in their
paper.
Our paper most closely resembles a set of papers which examine the causes of city level
employment and wage growth. In that literature, strong city performance has been variously
linked to city size, the diversity of employment in a city [Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and
Shleifer 1992], and the concentration of educated workers in a city [Moretti 2004]. In our
empirical work, we introduce measures capturing each of these eﬀects without substantially
changing the estimated eﬀect from our concentration of good jobs measure. Thus, whatever
we are identifying, it is over and above these other hypothesized driving forces. In our
estimates, the impact of good job concentration is much larger than the estimated impacts
of any of these other forces. Our paper is also related to the voluminous literature aimed
at understanding the eﬀects of international trade on wages since much of this literature
has debated the potential eﬀects of trade-induced changes in industrial composition. The
paper most closely related to ours is Borjas and Ramey [1995], which uses city level variation
similar to ours to examine how trade induced changes in industrial composition may have
aﬀected returns to skill. Our focus is, nevertheless, very diﬀerent since we focus on wage
levels rather than on returns to skill. As we shall show, this perspective appears important
since we ﬁnd little eﬀect of changes in industrial composition on the returns to skill but very
important eﬀects on wage levels.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. In Section 1, we present a heterogenous
ﬁrms setup to illustrate how changes in industrial composition in a sub-set of industries
can have substantial spill-over eﬀects of wage determination in other sectors. In Section
2, we use the model to derive a general empirical speciﬁcation which embeds alternative
views about the determination of wages. In particular, our empirical speciﬁcation allows
us to examine whether the data supports the wide spread view that general equilibrium
eﬀects from industrial composition changes are small and that the accounting approach is a
6justiﬁable procedure. In Section 3 we discuss the data used in the study and report basic
empirical results. In Section 4, 5 and 6 we address issues related to endogeneity, selection,
robustness and interpretation. Section 7 concludes.
1 A Simple Model of the Spill-over Eﬀects of Indus-
trial Composition.
The object of this section is to illustrate how changes in the composition of jobs between high
and low paying sectors in a sub-set of the economy can lead to wide-spread changes in wages
in the remaining sectors. The model combines elements from the holdup literature with
the literature on heterogenous ﬁrms. To make the analysis tractable, the model economy is
comprised of two distinct sub-sets of industries. In the ﬁrst subset (which we will call the
MC sector), ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive and face a traditional holdup problem.
The second set of industries (which we will call the FE, or free entry, sector) has free entry
of ﬁrms and, thus, a more competitive structure. However, due to matching frictions in the
labor market, ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of productivity will co-exist in equilibrium in the FE
sector. Our goal is to show how changes in demand patterns in the ﬁrst subset of industries
can aﬀect productivity and wages in the second set. In particular, the model will illustrate
how a shift in demand toward industries facing more extensive holdup problems will cause
a rationalization of production and higher wages in other sectors.
Although the model is highly stylized, it will be suﬃciently explicit to oﬀer a clear interpre-
tation for our empirical strategy. The main dividend of the model is its ability to illustrate
how the determinants of industrial composition can be summarized into one index, and how
variations in this index can aﬀect industry level wages. It is this feature of the model – the
potential link between the industrial composition index and industry level wages – which will
form the basis of our empirical exploration of the spill-over eﬀects of industrial composition
on wages.
1.1 Model
Consider an environment with a set, C, of local labor markets, called cities. In each city
there is a mass, L, of potential workers and there is a set, M = M1 + M2 , of industries.
For now, we will assume that workers are not mobile across cities. We will also assume
7that workers are equally productive and that all goods are tradeable. However, to preview
an extension we will make when we derive our empirical speciﬁcation, it is useful to note
that units of labor in the model can be interpreted as eﬀective units. Accordingly, one can
interpret all wage implications of the model as implications for wages controlling for human
capital diﬀerences.








σ, 0 < σ < 1
where diﬀerences in ai capture diﬀerences in demand across industries.
The set of industries is divided into two groups diﬀerentiated by their technology and com-
petitive structure. In each of the ﬁrst group of industries, i = 1 to M1, the good, Zi,c, is
produced by local monopolists. Before hiring workers, the employers in these locally mo-
nopolized industries must incur a capital cost of ki per worker. The local monopolists may
have diﬀerent levels of productivity, with Ωi,c denoting the amount of Zi,c produced by one
worker hired by industry i in city c. As will become clear, the main characteristic which will
drive local outcomes relates to whether a city’s comparative advantage is in industries with
high or low capital costs, ki.
The remaining industries, i = M1 + 1 to M2, are assumed to be competitive in the sense
that there is free entry into these sectors in each city. However, as in Melitz [2003], in order
to produce output in these industries, a ﬁrm must ﬁrst pay a ﬁxed setup cost F to uncover
its productivity level θ, where θ is draw from a distribution G(θ) with support [θ1,θ2]. For a
ﬁrm with productivity level θ, one unit of eﬀective labor produces θ units of output. Upon
learning its productivity, a ﬁrm decides whether to stay in the market or exit; with the exit
decision based on whether the ﬁrm will be able to attract and retain workers.
The total output Zi,c produced in city c for industry i is combined with outputs from other
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The timing of actions for the determination of wages and employment is as follows. Given
8the relative demand conditions captured by {ai}, the capital costs {ki}, and the pattern of
city level productivity {Ωi,c}, the monopolists in the MC sector decide how many workers
they would potentially like to hire by choosing to invest in multiples of ki. At the same
time, masses Ni,c of ﬁrms decide to enter into the diﬀerent competitive industries, and every
entering ﬁrm receives a productivity draw. After observing θ, ﬁrms decide whether to stay
or exit the market. Firms will stay in the market only if they expect to attract and retain
workers. Once entry decisions are made, workers can apply to one of the ﬁrms in the FE
sector (among those that have not exited) or they can wait to see whether they will be
hired in the MC sector. Since it is costless to apply to a FE sector ﬁrm and the decision
is reversible, all workers apply. When a worker applies for a job, he is matched with an
employer with probability 1−µ, (0 < µ < 1). When deciding where to apply, workers know
the identity of the industry but do not know each ﬁrm’s realization of θ and therefore apply
randomly to one of the active ﬁrms in the industry of their choice. If a worker is matched
with a ﬁrm, they bargain a wage. If a worker does not obtain a match with a ﬁrm in the
FE sector, or if the bargained wage is not suﬃciently attractive to the worker, the worker
can try his luck in the monopolistically competitive industries. Bargaining between a worker
and a ﬁrm in all sectors is governed by the rule of equal division of the surplus.
Since wages and employment possibilities in the MC sector will play the role of an outside
option for workers in the competitive sectors, it is best to ﬁrst solve for wage and employment
determination in these sectors. If a worker is hired by a ﬁrm in a MC sector, the wage is set
such that the surplus to the ﬁrm, given by Pi,cΩi,c −w, is equal to the surplus of the worker,
given by w−b; where Pi,c is the price of good Zi,c and b is the outside option of workers who
are waiting for employment in the monopolistically competitive industries.3 This bargaining
process implies that the wage paid in industry i, i = 1,...,M1, in city c is equal to
Pi,cΩi,c+b
2 .4
Foreseeing the outcome of wage bargaining, the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm will choose











i , and the production
3 Here we are assuming that if a worker is not employed in the MC sector then he cannot go back to
ﬁnd employment in the competitive sector. This assumption is purely for simplicity. If we allowed wage
determination in the competitive sector to aﬀect the outside option of workers in the MC sector, this would
simply amplify the results emphasized here.
4 For the bargaining outcome to take this precise form under an equal division rule, we are implicitly
assuming that the price Pi,c is determined at the same time as capacity.
9function Zi,c = Ωi,cli,c. This maximization problem implies that wages and employment in












From the above, we can see that wages will be highest in industries where ki is high. This
is a direct reﬂection of the standard holdup problem. Moreover, these wages do not vary by
city. Hence, there is an unambiguous sense in which an industry with a high setup cost, ki,
is a high wage industry. In contrast to wages, we see that city level employment within an
industry will vary depending on the city’s productivity. In order to focus on comparative
advantage instead of absolute advantage, we will assume that diﬀerences in Ωi,c across cities
is such that
PM1
i=1 li,c can be expressed as φL for all cities, 0 < φ < 1. Thus, an increase in
employment in one of the MC industries shifts the composition of employment but not the
overall level of employment. In this sense, a city with higher employment in one of the MC
industries is a city with a comparative advantage in this industry not one with an absolute
advantage in terms of a higher employment rate.
The employment equation in (1) also says that the preferred level of employment of a ﬁrm
in the MC sector can be determined independently of supply. Because of this, jobs in
these industries will generally be rationed. Accordingly, let ρc represent the probability of
employment of a worker who queues for a job in the MC industries. Assuming that ρc < 1,
and assuming that workers that queue up for jobs in the MC sector are matched randomly to
industries, the expected payoﬀ associated with queuing for a job in the MC sector, denoted
wA










+ (1 − ρc)b. (2)
The payoﬀ wA
c plays the role of outside option for workers applying to jobs in the FE sectors.
The bargained wage in industry i ∈ [M1+1,M1+M2], for a job with productivity θ, denoted
wi,c(θ), is again set to create an equal division of the surplus between the ﬁrm and the worker.
The equal division condition can be written as




















Knowing the outcome of bargaining, a ﬁrm will decide to stay in the market only if Pi,cθ > wA
c
or, alternatively, if θ >
wA
c
Pi,c. Using this observation, and noting that workers will allocate
themselves randomly across ﬁrms within a sector, we can express the average wage in com-

















, i = M1 + 1,...,M1 + M2 (4)
Since workers can choose the industry to which they apply among the M2 competitive indus-
tries, their application decisions will cause the expected wage to be equalized across those
industries, which in turn implies that they apply to industry i in proportion to ai. This equi-
librium mechanism will lead the prices, Pi,c, in the competitive industries to equal a price,
P, which is independent of c and i. Therefore in Equation (4), the only city level variable
aﬀecting wages is wA
c . Furthermore, since all workers apply for jobs in the competitive sector
and remain there if they are matched, the only workers that queue for jobs in the monopo-
listically competitive sectors are the µL workers that are not matched to a competitive ﬁrm.
This allows us to write the probability of obtaining a job in the MC industries as a function
of exogenous parameters, ρc =
φ
µ, where we assume that µ ≥ φ.6 Equations (4) and (2) can
5 We can also state how ﬁrms’ entry decisions is determined. Because of free entry, it must be the case
that the mass of ﬁrms entering each industry, denoted Ni,c, is such that there are zero expected proﬁts. The





















θdG(θ), and where Li represents the number of workers who apply to jobs in industry
i. In the above zero proﬁt condition, the term
(1−µ)L
M2Ni,c(1−G(wA
c )) represents the number of employees a ﬁrm
will have since
(1−µ)Lc
M2 is the number of employees that will be matched to sector i and Ni,c(1 − G(wA
c ))
represents the number of active ﬁrms in a sector.
6 In the current setup, the fraction of worker queing for jobs in the MC sector is determined mechanically
through the friction in the matching process given by µ. A less mechanical mechanism can be added to the
































The main element to notice from Equations (5) and (6) is how the distribution of employment
in the ﬁrst M1 industries, {li,c}
M1
i=1, (which itself is driven by diﬀerences in Ωi,c) spills over and
aﬀects wages in the remaining industries through its eﬀect on wA
c . This arises through two
channels. The ﬁrst channel simply relates to the increased bargaining position of workers
induced by an improved outside option. In particular, when a city has a distribution of
employment in the ﬁrst M1 industries which is heavily weighted towards higher paying jobs
then workers in the remaining M2 industries can extract more from any given employer by
threatening to leave and opt for the outside option. The second channel captures the eﬀects
of improved productivity of matches, echoing eﬀects emphasized in recent trade models such
as Melitz [2003] and Bernard, Eaton, Kortum and Jensen [2003]. Since relatively more high
paying jobs in the ﬁrst M1 industries causes an increase in wages in the other industries, ﬁrms
react to this change by staying in the market only if they are suﬃciently productive. This
eﬀect reﬂects a within-industry reallocation of employment toward more productive ﬁrms,
and since workers capture a fraction of the increased productivity, they obtain even higher
wages. This mechanism suggests that small changes in outside options could potentially
create substantial changes in wages due to a type of multiplier eﬀect whereby the ﬁrst
increase in wages causes increased productivity which generates further increases in wages.7
In order to render this model empirically relevant, it is useful to recognize how diﬀerences
in wA
c across cities can be captured by a simple industrial composition index which we will
denote by Rc. To this end, let us deﬁne the employment weighted average of national level












model by adding a cost to workers of applying to FE sector jobs. This will cause the fraction of workers that
queue for MC sector jobs to endogenously respond to wA
c , and thereby ensure that ρ is less that 1 even if µ
is smaller that φ.
7 It should be emphasized that frictions in the labor market are central to obtaining these results.




c is the national level average wage in industry i8, and we normalize the
wage premia to some industry, arbitrarily labeled as industry 1. Note that in the construction
of Rc, wage realizations in city c play a negligible role since the wages used in the index are
national averages. Since Rc is the average wage premium (relative to industry 1) across all
industries and wA
c is the weighted expected wage across a subset of industries, it is possible
to write one as a positive linear function of the other as follows.
w
A
c = d0 + d1Rc (7)














¯ w1 and d1 =
¯ w1
µ (1 − µ + φ).
We are now in a position to state the feature of this model which most interests us, that is the
relationship between industry level wages and a city’s industrial composition, as captured
by the index Rc. In particular, based on Equations (5), (6) and (7), we see that a city with a
higher value of Rc is predicted to exhibit higher wages across a whole set of industries since
in such a city workers have a strong bargaining position and this strong bargaining position
forces a rationalization of production in heterogenous ﬁrm industries. Such a property implies
that changes in industry mix has spill-over eﬀects on wages that go beyond the sectors where
the composition of employment has changed.9 This relationship can be expressed in reduced
form as
wic = Q(Rc), Q
0(Rc) > 0 ,i = 1,...,M1 (8)
Up to now, we have been implicitly focusing on how changes in a city’s pattern of comparative
advantage, working through Rc (or equivalently through wA
c ), aﬀects industry level wages.
However, in the model there are actually two sources of variation – which work through
Rc – that can cause changes in a city’s industry level wage patterns. The ﬁrst regards
changes in across industry demand patterns induced by changes in {ai}. Such changes will
have diﬀerential impacts on the composition of employment across cities since cities have
diﬀerent concentrations in the various industries based on their comparative advantages.
Thus, changes in the national demand pattern will change Rc (and wA
c ), and hence local
wages, by changing the local composition of employment. A second channel relates to changes
8 For simplicity, we are assuming that cities have the same size of population.
9 Formally, the model oﬀers a mapping between comparative advantage patterns as driven by {Ωi,c}
M1
i=1
and industry level wages with a city. The key feature of this mapping is that the eﬀect of {Ωi,c}
M1
i=1 on wages
can be conceptualized as transiting through a simple index of industrial composition.
13in holdup problems as captured by changes in {ki}. These changes will lead to changes in
the industrial wage premia in the MC sector as well as changes in the local composition
of employment, implying, again, changes in Rc (and wA
c ) that aﬀect local wages. In the
empirical section, we will exploit these two potential channels of aggregate level changes in
either {ai} or {ki} to develop an instrumental variable strategy for examining the presence
of spill-over eﬀects of changes in Rc on industry level wages.
In the model as set out, we assume that workers cannot move between cities to take advantage
of diﬀerences in wages. It is important to emphasize that this assumption can easily be
relaxed without losing the main implications of the model. In particular, consider the case
where workers are mobile across cities but cities with higher population have higher land
prices. In this case, if land enters a worker’s utility function, worker mobility will not entirely
overturn the model’s implication that cities with more jobs in the high paying sectors will
pay higher wages in many sectors. This is true because workers will not continue to move
until wage parity is obtained. Instead, they will move only to the point where the marginal
worker has the same expected utility across cities. Hence, with labor mobility, much of the
increased productivity induced by better outside options for workers may largely (or entirely)
be captured by land prices, but it should nevertheless ﬁrst be reﬂected in wages.
2 Deriving an Empirical Speciﬁcation
The main empirical implication we take away from the model is that the presence of a set of
high paying jobs in a local labor market can have spill-over eﬀects on wages in other sectors,
even when the price of the goods produced in these other sectors are identical across markets
and ﬁrms make zero expected proﬁts. As we will make clear, the prediction of a spill-over
eﬀect is in direct conﬂict with assumptions needed to justify an accounting approach when
evaluating the impact of goods jobs on average wages.
The ﬁrst issue that arises in deriving a usable empirical speciﬁcation is to allow for individual
worker heterogeneity. If we assume that workers diﬀer in terms of human capital and that
this human capital augments a worker’s productivity in all sectors then worker heterogeneity
can be introduced easily in the above model. In particular, consider a worker, indexed
by k, who has a vector of amounts of observable characteristics, xkct, and an amount of
unobserved (to the researcher) human capital given by kct. Then, given returns on the
observed characteristics, β1t, the productivity of this worker in a ﬁrm with a productivity
14draw of θ is given by θexp(β1tXkct + kct). In this case, the log wage paid to a worker can
be expressed as,
lnWkict = β1txkct + ln(wict) + k,c,t, (9)
where wict is the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor as given in (8) except that we have now
introduced a time subscript. Note that the lower case wict’s implied by the model should
now be interpreted as industry speciﬁc wages after controlling for human capital diﬀerences.
As noted earlier, the main implication we take away from the model is the positive eﬀect of
industrial composition, Rct, on industry speciﬁc wages, wict. Using a linear approximation
to this relationship, we can re-write (9) as a function of Rct, yielding our main estimating
equation:
lnWkict ≈ β0t + β1txkct + β2Rct + νi,t + νc + kct (10)
In this speciﬁcation, we are allowing for the possibilities that cities face diﬀerent transporta-
tion costs for the aggregate good, yc, and that workers may have systematic preferences
over jobs in diﬀerent industries by including city ﬁxed eﬀects, νc and industry eﬀects, νi,t.
Moreover, we allow for general time eﬀects and for changes in returns to human capital over
time.
Our main interest in (10) is in the sign and size of β2. The model in the previous section
points to a positive eﬀect of Rc,t on individual wages (i.e., β2 > 0) both because it provides
workers with a higher outside option in wage bargaining and because of eﬃciency enhancing
eﬀects arising from low productivity ﬁrms dropping out of production. That is, cities with
an industrial composition that is more heavily weighted toward high wage premia industries
will have higher wages across other industries. It is worth emphasizing that the industrial
premia used in constructing Rc,t are estimated using national, not city, level data. Hence,
even if a city had higher wages in all industries, this would not translate into a higher Rc,t.10
Note, moreover, that the composition eﬀect could be sizeable even if total employment in
the MC sector is quite small since what is important is not the size of these industries but
the fact that they are present in the market and thereby aﬀect the bargaining position of
workers in other industries. Even though an outside option would not remain very attractive
10One implication of this is that high Rc,t cities are not necessarily high average skill cities.
15if all workers were to simultaneously exploit it; in the bargaining process, all workers can
use it as a default option without it losing value.
It is helpful to contrast Equation (10) with the analogous equation that would be derived
from a more standard model. To this end, consider a situation where wages are equal to the
value of marginal product in each industry and where there are no diﬀerences in technology
within an industry across ﬁrms or cities. If these industrial technologies require labor and
capital then, assuming ﬁrms have access to a common capital market, this implies that there
is eﬀectively constant returns to scale for labor at the city level. To see this, consider the
case where the production function for good i is of the form yi = K
γ
ict(φitˆ lict)1−γ, where Kict
is the capital stock used to produce good i, ˆ lict is the human capital weighted sum of labor
used in sector i ( ˆ lict =
P
exp(β1txkict +kict)), φit represents labour augmenting technology
and 0 ≤ γ < 1. In this case, if ﬁrms can rent capital on a common market at price rit then
the wage paid to individual k in industry i in city c is of the form
lnWkict = νit + β1txkict + kct (11)
where the time and industry varying intercept νit corresponds to a combination of rental




(1−γ) lnrit + lnθit. The
main diﬀerence between Equation (11) and Equation (10) is that the industrial composition
of employment does not determine industry speciﬁc wages in Equation (11), while it does
in Equation (10). In fact, in this more standard setup, there is no systematic source for
across city variation in industry speciﬁc wages. The systematic sources of variation in wages
are concentrated at the industry-cross-time level. It is worth pointing out that this same
conclusion would be reached using a standard Hecksher-Ohlin model with trade and assuming
the local economies are within the cone of diversiﬁcation: with the implied factor price
equalization, industry speciﬁc wages should not vary with local employment distributions
[Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2005].
This example is of special interest since it delivers exactly the type of economic structure
which validates the simple accounting approach to the evaluation of the eﬀects of change in
industrial policy on average wages. To see this, note that the standard accounting approach
involves ﬁrst estimating an equation similar to Equation (11) and recovering the industry
speciﬁc intercepts νit. These estimated industry coeﬃcients correspond to the inter-industry











which shows how the average (log) wage in a city changes with the change in industrial
composition when using a given set of industry wage premia. The structure underlying
(11) implies that changes in the local industrial composition of employment do not alter the
industry premia and thus, Act is a reasonable way to measure the impact of industrial change
on the average wage. However, if wages are determined, instead, according to Equation (10)
then we must include the impact of changes in local composition on local wages and the total









)] + β2(Rct+1 − Rct) = Act + β2(Rct+1 − Rct).
Interestingly, the change in Rct is very closely related to Act given that the change in Rct
can itself be written as







where we have exploited the fact that
¯ wit
¯ w1t −1 = νit. Hence the average (log) wage change in
a city can be expressed as







It is worth emphasizing that in the case where ν is not varying over time, then the change in
Rc,t is exactly the amount the accounting approach attributes to changes in industrial com-
position. This observation provides insights on how to interpret the β2 coeﬃcient one would
retrieve from estimating Equation (10) across the whole set of industries. This relationship
highlights that the estimated β2 represents the spill-over eﬀects of industrial composition on
average wages – above that accounted for by the accounting approach– calculated in mul-
tiples of the accounting eﬀect. For example, if β2 where estimated to be equal to .5 then
the total eﬀect of changes in industrial composition on average wages should be taken to
be 1.5 times the eﬀect implied by a simple accounting approach that neglects any possible
spill-over eﬀects. This observation will be useful for evaluating the economic importance of
any estimates of spill-over eﬀects that we may obtain.
172.1 Empirical Implementation
Our baseline empirical speciﬁcation is given by the ﬁrst diﬀerence of Equation (10). Our goal
is to investigate the null hypothesis that β2 = 0 or, in other words, whether a speciﬁcation
such as Equation (11) (and the factor price equalization theory that underlies it) provides
an appropriate description of wage determination in local economies. Support for this null
hypothesis would indicate that the standard accounting procedure can be used to properly
evaluate the eﬀects of a local change in the composition of employment on the local average
wage. Our alternative hypothesis is that β2 > 0. A ﬁnding of β2 > 0 would indicate the
presence of a spill-over from industrial composition to wages as predicted by the model
and would indicate that the standard accounting approach is an inappropriate means of
evaluating the eﬀects of changes in industrial composition on average wages. However, we
recognize that such spill-over eﬀects may also arise for reasons other than those emphasized
in the model, and we will explore such possibilities.
When estimating the eﬀect of Rct on wages, we need to worry about omitted variable bias,
especially given existing alternative explanations for diﬀerences in wages across cities such
as those related to city size, education levels (Moretti [2004], Acemoglu and Angrist [1999]),
and diversity of employment in a city [Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1992]. To
control for such issues, we introduce measures related to these explanations as additional
covariates, zc,t, in most of our estimations. As we discuss in detail below, we also address
the important issues of endogeneity of Rc,t and the potential for worker mobility to cause a
sample selection bias.
The actual estimation procedure we use throughout is a common two stage procedure. In the
ﬁrst stage, we regress log wages on a vector of individual characteristics separately for each
Census year, forming industry × city group averages of the residuals from the regression.
We then use diﬀerences in those averages as the dependent variable in our main estimating
regression, which takes the following form
∆logWict = ∆νit + β∆Rct + ∆zctδ + eict (13)
where Zct is a set of additional city level control variables.
183 Data and Basic Results
3.1 Data
The data we use in the following investigations come from the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000
US Census Public Use Micro-Samples (PUMS). We focus on wage and salary earners, aged
20 to 65 with positive weekly wages who were living in a metropolitan area at the time of
the Census. To form our dependent variable we use the log of weekly wages, calculated
by dividing wage and salary income by annual weeks worked (we also report results using
hourly wages). We deal with real wages (in 1990 dollars) using the national level CPI as the
deﬂator. Given our use of multiple Censuses, an important part of our data construction
is the creation of consistent deﬁnitions of cities, education groups and industries over time.
We provide the details on how we address these issues in Appendix A.
As we described in the previous section, we carry out our estimation in two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage we run individual level regressions of log wages using all the individuals in our
national sample on categorical education variables (4 categories), a quadratic in experience,
interactions of the experience and education variables, a gender dummy, black and immigrant
dummy variables, and the complete set of interactions of the gender, race and immigrant
dummies with all the education and experience variables. We run these regressions sepa-
rately by Census year to allow for changes in returns to skills over time. We then calculate
averages of the residuals for each industry/city combination in each year and use those as
the dependent variable in the second stage regression (equation (13) above). We eliminate
all industry-city cells with fewer than 20 included individuals in any of the years. We use
standard deviations for the constructed industry-city means to form weights for the second
stage estimation. For most of our estimates, we used decadal diﬀerences within industry-city
cells for each pair of decades in our data (1980- 1970, 1990-1980, 2000-1990), pooling these
together into one large dataset. In all the estimation results we calculate standard errors
allowing for clustering by city and year.
The main covariate in our estimation is the Rct variable which is a function of the industrial
wage premia and the proportion of workers in each industry in a city. We estimate the
wage premia in a regression at the national level in which we control for the same set of
education, experience, gender, race and immigration variables described for our ﬁrst stage
wage regression and also include a full set of industry dummy variables. This regression is
19estimated separately for each Census year. The coeﬃcients on the industry dummy variables
are what we use as the wage premia in constructing our R measures.
3.2 OLS Results
We begin our presentation of results with the estimates from speciﬁcation (13) without the
inclusion of any additional control (Zct) variables. The ﬁrst column of Table (1) contains the
results from OLS estimation of the regression. This regression and all of those that follow
include a full set of industry dummy variables (144), thus allowing for changes in industry
premia over time, but we do not present the long list of corresponding coeﬃcients here.
The coeﬃcient on the change in R variable is 2.62 and is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at any conventional signiﬁcance level. If OLS provides consistent estimates of this
coeﬃcient, the fact that this coeﬃcient is both economically substantial and statistically
signiﬁcant implies a rejection of the null hypothesis that the impact of changes in the com-
position of employment in a city is completely captured in the standard accounting measure,
Act. Further, the coeﬃcient ﬁts with the alternative hypothesis that cities with employment
structures that shift toward higher premia industries have better wage performance within
industries. Recall from our discussion of the deﬁnition of the R variable that the magnitude
of the coeﬃcient on this variable can be interpreted as a multiple of the standard accounting
eﬀect. Thus, the OLS estimate implies that the total eﬀect on average wages of a shift in
composition toward higher paying industries is approximately three and a half times what is
measured from a standard accounting measure. This total eﬀect may initially sound overly
large but it is worth recalling that the accounting measure eﬀects tend to be quite small. For
example, let us consider the average real weekly wage for men with a BA or higher education
(examples with other education or gender groups give similar results). For this group, the
average wage increased by 8% across the cities in our sample between 1980 and 1990. If we
recalculate the 1990 average wage for this group holding the industrial composition constant,
the increase becomes 7%, implying that the accounting measure of the impact of shifts in
industrial composition is 1%. Our estimates suggest that the total impact of shifts in indus-
trial composition would be 3.5% in this example. Such an increase is certainly larger than
what is usually attributed to industrial shifts but is still only just over 40% of the overall
increase. The fact that direct accounting measures of the impact of industrial shifts tend to
be small has led to a discounting of explanations for changes in the US wage structure that
might show up through such shifts. Trade, for example, is usually relegated to a lower place
20in the list of potential explanations for this reason. An estimate of the size we report may
imply that there is reason to re-examine those types of explanations.
One point of interest about this result is whether it is being driven by a subset of cities,
such as those that faced particularly large re-adjustment after the diﬃculties in the domestic
automobile industry. To examine this, in Figure (1) we plot the change in city average wages
(the average of our dependent variable across industries within a city) against ∆ Rct.11 The
key point from this ﬁgure is that there is a strong positive relationship between wage changes
and changes in our R measure that is not driven by outliers.
We are also interested in whether the estimated eﬀect stems from some particular set of in-
dustries with which wages are particularly sensitive to the presence of high premia industries.
For example, service sector workers might be particular beneﬁciaries of having more high
paid workers in a city through a simple demand route. We investigate this by re-estimating
our basic speciﬁcation interacting the ∆R variable with a complete set of industry dummy
variables. This is equivalent to re-writing the β2 coeﬃcient with an i subscript. In Figure
(2), we present a histogram of the full set of these β2i coeﬃcients. What is noteworthy in
this ﬁgure is the concentration of values around the mean. The implication is that workers
in virtually all industries beneﬁt from a shift in employment composition toward high paying
sectors and beneﬁt to much the same degree. Thus, any explanation for the impact of shift-
ing the industrial composition toward higher premium industries must have the character
that it predicts wide ranging impacts, not just spillovers to industries that are in some sense
close to the high premium industries. It is worth recalling when considering this result that
we estimate industry premia while controlling for observable skills. Thus, high premium
industries are not necessarily high skill industries.
4 Addressing Endogeneity and Selection Issues
4.1 Endogeneity: Methods and Results
The simple OLS regression in the previous section points to an estimate of β2 that is sub-
stantial and positive. However, that coeﬃcient may not equal zero even when there are no
11We actually ﬁrst regress ∆ Wict on industry dummies and plot the weighted average of the residuals
from that regression in order to obtain a plot that replicates our actual regression.
21general equilibrium eﬀects of the kind we are considering because of some combination of
worker selection across locations and/or endogeneity issues related to the Rct measure.
To understand the potential endogeneity issues, return to the decomposition of the over-
time movements in Rct given in (12). The Rct measure moves with shifts in the set of local
employment shares, lict. One might expect local demand composition to aﬀect the set of
local industrial wages since the wage in a given industry would likely rise with increased
demand in other industries that employ a closely related set of skills. This would imply a
non-zero coeﬃcient on ∆R even in the absence of broader general equilibrium eﬀects of the
kind described in the model in the ﬁrst section.
We respond to this potential problem using three sets of instrumental variables for ∆R. The
ﬁrst is constructed using the following procedure. We ﬁrst predict a level of employment for
industry i in city c in period t + 1 using the formula:





That is, we predict future employment in industry i in city c using the employment in that
industry in period t multiplied by the growth rate for the industry at the national level.
Using these predicted values, we construct a set of predicted industry speciﬁc employment
shares, ˆ sict =
ˆ lict P




νit(ˆ sict+1 − sict) (14)
where, sict is the share of employment in city c in time t that is in industry i. This variable is
closely related to the ﬁrst term in the decomposition of the R measure given in (12). Thus,
this instrument isolates the variation in ∆R that stems from changes in the employment
composition but instead of using actual employment share changes, we use predicted changes
based on national level changes, breaking the direct link between city level employment and
wage changes. Essentially, IV 1 focuses attention on the question, “what is the impact on
local wages of a national level demand shift (stemming from, for example, trade or preference
shocks) if that shift is distributed across cities according to start of period employment
shares?” Recall that use of this type of variation is implied by the model, where shift in
national level demand ({ai}) are translated into local shifts in employment shares because of
local diﬀerences in comparative advantage that will be reﬂected in initial period employment
shares.
22Our second instrument is designed to isolate the variation inherent in the second term in
the decomposition, (12): the variation stemming from changes in wage premia over time,
weighted by the importance of the relevant industry in the local economy. Thus, our second





This instrument may initially seem less natural, since the discussion to this point has been
almost entirely couched in terms of shifts in the concentration of employment. However, if
our theoretical explanation, which emphasizes bargaining power, is correct then it should
not matter whether the average premia available in the city declines because a high paying
industry shuts down or because the premium paid in that industry declines.12 In either
case, workers in other industries end up with a less valuable outside option. This would
imply that we should get similar results using IV 1 and IV 2. Hence, examining whether the
results obtained using these two alternative instruments are the same provides a means of
evaluating whether the outside option eﬀect outlined is Section 2 is the likely mechanism at
play.
We also implement a third instrumenting strategy based on the fact that both IV 1 and
IV 2 are functions of initial period employment shares, sict. Rather than restrict ourselves to
speciﬁc functions of those shares, as we do in the ﬁrst two instruments, our third approach is
to use the set of shares in 21 aggregate industries in the initial period as our instruments.13
All three instruments perform well in the ﬁrst stage estimation. The F-statistic from the
test of the signiﬁcance of IV 1 in the ﬁrst stage regression of ∆R on the instrument takes a
value of 81.9 and has an associated p-value of 0.0. The same statistic for IV 2 is 140 with a
p- value of 0 and for IV 3 is 5.5 also with an associated p-value of 0.0.
We present results from instrumental variables estimation using each of our instruments
individually, in the last three columns of Table (1). Thus, the second column contains
results from instrumental variable estimation in which we use IV 1, our instrument which
uses national level variation in employment shifts. The estimated coeﬃcient is very similar
12Indeed, in the model in the ﬁrst section, changes in the holdup problem stemming from {ki} aﬀect the
alternative wage for workers in the FE sector both through changes in the national level wage premia and
in the local composition of employment.
13As we described earlier, our estimation is based on 144 industries and 152 cities. Aggregating to 21
industries for this instrument allows for a reasonable number of degrees of freedom in the ﬁrst stage regression.
23to that obtained from OLS estimation and is again highly statistically signiﬁcant. The third
column contains results when we use IV 2, the instrument that uses changes in industry
premia over time. The similarity in the estimated coeﬃcients obtained using IV 1 and IV 2
is striking; an outcome which we have argued ﬁts well with theories of the impact of R that
are based on changes in bargaining power. Thus, for example, the decline in the steel industry
in what came to be called the Rust Belt resulted both in lower employment in steel jobs and
lower wages within the steel industry over time [Beeson, Shaw, and Shore-Sheppard 2001].
The results in columns 2 and 3 of Table (1) indicate that both types of change had the same
impact on wages within other industries, as implied by our bargaining story.
The ﬁnal column of Table (1) provides estimates when we use our least restrictive instrument,
IV 3. The estimated β2 coeﬃcient is somewhat smaller than from the other speciﬁcations
but still implies that the total eﬀect of a change in composition is 2.8 times that obtained
from a simple accounting approach and is still highly statistically signiﬁcant.
4.2 Selection: Methods and Results
Our second key concern is with selection of workers across cities. The R variable varies at
the city level over time. Thus, changes in unobserved skills in a city that are correlated
with movements of R will imply a non-zero coeﬃcient on R that does not reﬂect general
equilibrium eﬀects of the type we are considering. For example, suppose that there are
unobserved skills (which we will call ability) and that high premia industries can choose
higher ability workers from lines of applicants. Suppose, further that the most able workers
move out of a city if it loses a high paying industry, regardless of the industry in which they
themselves are employed, because they want to live in a place where they have a chance of
getting into a higher paying job. In that case, shifts in R may actually pick up the eﬀects of
shifts in the unobserved ability distribution.14
14It is interesting to consider this type of selection issue in the context of a model with no GE eﬀects
such as a simple Hecksher-Ohlin model. In such a model, shifts in the distribution of an unobserved (to
the researcher) skill across cities (perhaps because of changing valuations of amenities) does not imply that
the R measure should enter our regressions signiﬁcantly since factor price equalization should still hold and,
thus, local shares of any skills will not change local wages. Suppose, however, that one of these skills, which
we will call the comparative advantage ability, is unobserved (so that our estimated industry premia partly
reﬂect returns to that skill) and, in addition, there is an absolute advantage skill which allows a worker to be
better in all jobs. Now suppose that there is an amenity in a given city that attracts both high comparative
advantage and high absolute advantage workers since they can aﬀord to pay for the amenity. In that situation,
the industrial mix in the high amenity city will shift toward industries that use the comparative advantage
ability intensively (implying an increase in R) and, at the same time, the number of high absolute advantage
workers will increase. This is a case where the estimated β2 coeﬃcient will be non-zero even though the
24We address selection concerns in a number of ways. First, we control for observable skill
variables (education and experience) both when estimating the wage premia in the national
level wage regression and when obtaining the industry-city average wages that form our key
dependent variable. Our second approach is to implement the selection correction estimator
that Dahl [2002] proposes and implements in his examination of regional variation in returns
to education.
To understand the nature of Dahl’s approach, consider a model in which each worker has a
(latent) wage value that he would earn if he lived in each possible city and chooses to live in
the city in which his wage net of moving costs is highest. This implies that we should write
the regression corresponding to observed wages as,
E(lnWkict|dkct = 1) = β0t + β1txkct + β2Rct + νi + νc + E(kct|dkct = 1) (15)
where dkct is a dummy variable equaling one if worker k is observed in city c at time t.
The last, error mean, term is non-zero if worker city selection is not independent of the
unobserved component of wages. If one were to estimate equation (13) not taking account of
this error mean term then the estimated regression coeﬃcients will suﬀer from well-known
consistency problems.
In situations such as the union wage premium literature where there are only two options
facing a worker, it is well known that the error mean term can be expressed as a function of the
probability of selecting the given option [Heckman 1979, Lee 1983]. In our case, with multiple
possible destinations to choose from, the error mean term will potentially be a function of
characteristics of all of them, making estimation complicated. Dahl [2002] argues that under
speciﬁc suﬃciency conditions, the error mean term is only a function of the probability
that a person born in the same state as k would make the choice that k actually made,
greatly simplifying the problem. In his examination of the impact of selection of location
across states on returns to education, however, he argues that the suﬃciency assumption
is overly restrictive and that one can eﬀectively account for selection using functions of the
probability k did not move from his state of birth and the probability he moved to the state
in which he is observed at the time of the Census. Following work such as Ahn and Powell
[1993] and Heckman and Robb [1985] for the binary choice case, he also proposes a non-
parametric estimator for the relevant probabilities and the function of them that enters the
regression of interest. We follow his approach with a few adjustments to account for the facts
basic trade model (with the addition of the absolute advantage ability) holds, simply because the R measure
is correlated with unobserved ability.
25that we include immigrants in our analysis and that we are dealing with cities. Details on
our selection estimation are provided in Appendix B. In essence, this estimator identiﬁes the
error mean (selection) eﬀect using diﬀerences in the probabilities of being observed in a given
city between two people who are identical in education, experience, race and gender but are
born in diﬀerent states. The idea is that, for example, people born in Oregon are more
likely to be observed in Seattle than people born in Pennsylvania because Oregon is so much
closer. If both are in fact observed living in Seattle then we are assuming that the person
from Pennsylvania must have a larger Seattle speciﬁc “ability” (a stronger earnings related
reason for being there) and this is what is being captured when we include functions of the
relevant probabilities of being observed in Seattle for each of them. Identiﬁcation in this
approach is based on the exclusion of state of birth by current city of residence interactions
from the wage regression. That is, we assume that being born in a state close to your city
of residence (or, more generally, a state with a high associated probability of moving to that
city) does not directly determine the wage a worker receives.15
In practical terms, this approach to the potential selection problem again involves two esti-
mation steps. In the ﬁrst, as before, we estimate individual level regressions of log wages on
the same complete set of education, experience, race, immigrant status and gender variables
as before but now also add our proxies for the error mean term. We then form averages by
city and industry from the residuals from that regression and then proceed with the second
stage regressions as before. The coeﬃcients on the error mean proxy variables are jointly
highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage regressions, implying that there are signiﬁcant sample
selection issues being addressed with this estimator.
In Table (2), we recreate the results from Table (1) while implementing Dahl (2002)’s selec-
tion correction. The resulting estimates for β2 are very similar in magnitude to those obtained
when we did not correct for sample selection. Thus, we do not believe that movements in
unobserved ability across cities is strongly contaminating our estimates. Nonetheless, in
all subsequent sections of the paper, we present results incorporating Dahl’s sample selec-
tion correction. The implication of the selection analysis is that while workers do select
themselves across cities in a manner that is non-random with respect to earnings outcomes,
changes in their selection pattern are not correlated with changes in the average industrial
premium paid in a city.
15Note that this is diﬀerent from assuming that state of birth does not aﬀect current wages since, even
if we include a set of state of birth dummy variables in our ﬁrst stage estimation, our approach remains
identiﬁed oﬀ interactions between city-of-employment and state-of-birth.
265 Further Explorations of the Wage Premia Eﬀects
5.1 Other Driving Forces for City Level Wage Changes
Ours is certainly not the ﬁrst attempt to examine the determinants of city level wage changes
and/or city-level growth. The literature on what makes for a high performing city has
produced a number of hypotheses. In this section, we introduce measures corresponding to
some of the more prominent hypotheses to see whether our Rct measure may be capturing
one of these alternative driving forces.
Possibly the most intuitive explanation of diﬀerential wage growth across cities is diﬀerences
in aggregate demand. Our estimated β2 coeﬃcient, for example, may just be picking up
spill-overs in demand for products of related industries when a particular high wage industry
re-locates to a town. Or, more generally, such a re-location will increase the general demand
for workers in an area, driving up wages across the local economy. Blanchard and Katz
[1992] examine the implications of demand shifts for local wages and employment using US
data and argue that negative demand shocks in a locality lead to a permanent shift down
in employment and a negative adjustment in wages that eventually dissipates. Greenstone
and Moretti [2003] examine the impact on wages and housing prices of attracting a large
manufacturing plant to a town by comparing outcomes in towns that won a competition for
such a plant to towns that made the short list in the same competition but ultimately lost.
Their results indicate that both the wage bill in the industry in which the plant is situated
and local housing prices rise in the three year period following the arrival of the plant. While
it is not the focus of the paper, Greenstone and Moretti also show that the arrival of the
plant has a positive impact on the wage bill in other industries in the receiving town. It is
diﬃcult to compare our results to those in Greenstone and Moretti [2003] since the wage bill
eﬀects they estimate are a combination of employment eﬀects and the wage eﬀects we are
measuring. Nonetheless, it is interesting that they also ﬁnd evidence of spill-overs.
Our approach diﬀers from both Blanchard and Katz [1992] and Greenstone and Moretti
[2003] in that we focus on longer term impacts of diﬀerences in the composition of employ-
ment while both of those papers focus on adjustments to demand shocks. One way in which
we try to insure we are capturing composition eﬀects is through the construction of our Rct
measure. In particular, our Rct measure is based on employment shares and so does not di-
rectly increase with increases in employment. Nevertheless, changes in our Rct measure may
27be correlated with local demand shifts, implying that this is really what we are capturing.
This turns out not to be the case: as we show in Section 6, in a simple regression of changes
in employment rates on the change in Rct, the latter has a coeﬃcient that is essentially zero
and is statistically insigniﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance level. Nonetheless, since this
is such a prominent alternative explanation, we adopt several strategies to examine it more
closely.16
Our ﬁrst strategy is to construct a measure of changes in local demand which equals the
sum of industry speciﬁc growth rates in each city, with each industry’s growth rate weighted
by its share in city employment at the start of the decade. This essentially states that total
growth in employment reﬂects general increases in demand regardless of the sector in which
the increase occurs. In contrast, the Rct measure emphasizes movements that favour higher
premium industries. In the speciﬁcations where we instrument for Rct, we also instrument
for this change in local demand measure in a manner similar to IV 1. In particular, we use
growth rates for the industry at the national level weighted by initial period employment
shares in the particular city as an instrument.
We also include the change in own-industry employment share as a separate regressor in the
speciﬁcation in order to control for potential problems that might arise if movements in Rct
are dominated by a particular industry in a city, with our estimated coeﬃcient then picking
up the relationship between that industry’s shifts and its own wage. We again instrument for
it using national level changes in the industry share in the speciﬁcations where we instrument
for the other two variables.
The results from this exercise are given in the ﬁrst three columns of Table (3). The ﬁrst col-
umn is estimated with OLS. In the second column we use an instrumental variable estimator
in which the instruments used are IV 1 and the instruments just described. Columns 2 and
3 contain results from speciﬁcations in which we use IV 2 or IV 3 and the other instruments.
The results indicate that including the overall demand measure does aﬀect the coeﬃcient on
∆R. This ﬁts with the ﬁnding that changes in Rct and changes in employment are almost
orthogonal.
In the second set of columns in Table (3) we use a simpler measure of demand, replacing
the overall demand measure with the local employment rate. This diﬀers from using the
16An adjustment to the model from section 1 in which we allow shifts in employment in the MC industries
to aﬀect the employment rate in a city as well as the industrial composition of employment implies further,
positive impacts on wages from an expansion of high paying industries. Thus, including the employment
rate as an overall demand measure can be seen as capturing this added dimension.
28overall demand measure in that the latter reﬂects changes in city size that are not captured
in the employment rate. Again, controlling for the employment rate helps emphasize the
point that the estimated coeﬃcient on Rct corresponds to the impact of shifts in employment
composition not the level of employment. The employment rate itself enters positively and
statistically signiﬁcantly, implying that wages increase in cities with increasing employment.
Such an eﬀect can be easily shown to be consistent with our bargaining framework. Moreover,
the β2 coeﬃcient remains the same size and signiﬁcance when this measure is introduced.
The coeﬃcient on own employment share is again small and typically insigniﬁcant.
An alternative explanation for city level growth is provided in Glaeser et al. [1992]. They
examine city level growth over time in the US, comparing the impact of measures of city
size, which would be important determinants of growth if agglomeration type models were
driving growth patterns, and measures of the industrial diversity of the economy. They argue
that the importance of diversity is implied by, for example, Jane Jacob’s theorizing. They
ﬁnd that industrial diversity is a stronger determinant of city speciﬁc growth than city size.
In the ﬁrst three columns of Table (4), we introduce a measure of the “fractionalization” of
employment in a city at the start of each decade. The measure of fractionalization we use
is one minus the Herﬁndahl index, or one minus the sum of squared industry shares. This
measure itself tends not to be signiﬁcant in our estimates and, more importantly, does not
change our estimates of the β2 coeﬃcient.
Finally, a recent literature on education externalities examines the claim that having a
larger proportion of workers in a city being highly educated beneﬁts all workers in the city.
Moretti [2004], for example, in an examination of wages in US cities in the 1980s ﬁnds that
cities with a greater increase in the proportion of workers with a BA or higher education
have higher wage gains. Acemoglu and Angrist [1999] ﬁnd weaker results for the impact of
education using average years of education in a city. Again, we are interested in whether
our Rct measure is actually picking up this alternative eﬀect. It is worth re-emphasizing,
though, that we control for education in the regressions from which we estimate our national
level wage premia and, thus, the Rct measure does not reﬂect cities that have high wages
because they have high levels of education. In the middle set of three columns in Table (4),
we introduce the change in the proportion of workers with a BA or higher education (the
College Share) as an additional regressor. The college share variable itself enters signiﬁcantly,
supporting Moretti [2004]’s ﬁndings, but introducing this variable has very little impact on
our estimates of the eﬀect of changes in Rct.17 In the next set of columns in Table (4), we
17It is worth noting, though, that Sand [2006] ﬁnds that this positive and signiﬁcant impact is observed
29use average years of education as an alternative measure of the education level of a city.
This latter variable does not enter signiﬁcantly, supporting results in Acemoglu and Angrist
[1999] and ﬁtting with the often contradictory results in this literature. Moreover, including
average years of education does not aﬀect the estimates of our Rct eﬀects.
In the last set of columns of Table (4) we introduce the overall demand measure, the college
share measure and the fractionalization measure at the same time. Again, there is little
impact of introducing these variables on the estimated β2 coeﬃcient. Our conclusion is that
while some of the other hypothesized factors may aﬀect city level wage growth, we are not
inadvertently picking any of them up with our Rct measure. Moreover, the impact of the
shift in industrial composition toward higher paying industries is much larger than any of
the eﬀects from these competing explanations.
5.2 Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we examine the robustness of our estimates to a series of variations in
our estimation approach. The ﬁrst of these relates to our deﬁnitions of cities and industries.
The use of data from 1970 through 2000 is a strength in that it allows us to see whether
the eﬀects we are measuring show up over a long period of time. However, the downside of
using such a long period is that we are forced to be restrictive in our deﬁnitions of cities
and industries in order to have consistency over the whole period. In particular, we are
forced to drop some cities because we cannot create a consistent deﬁnition for them over the
whole time period18 and we are forced to base our industry categories on a 1950 classiﬁcation
scheme that might not be well suited to capturing shifts across industries in a more recent
era. To check on the sensitivity of our estimates to these issues, we re-estimated our main
speciﬁcations using data only from the period 1980 to 2000. Dropping 1970 allows us to
increase the number of consistently deﬁned cities from 152 to 231 and allows to increase the
number of industry categories from 144 to 221. We also shift to a 1980 Census deﬁnition
of industries. Using the 1980 - 2000 data, we again estimate in two stages, with the initial
stage being individual wage regressions run separately by Census. We then form 10 year
diﬀerences in the regression- adjusted city-industry average log wages and use those in the
second stage regression, pooling the 1980-90 and 1990-2000 diﬀerences. The results are found
in Table (5), which is a recreation of Table (1) based on this alternate sample. The estimated
in the 1980s but not in the 1970s or 1990s when estimation is carried out separately by decade.
18This restriction is not related to rapidity of growth of cities but rather to inconsistencies in the deﬁnitions
of our building block geographical units (counties and PUMA’s) across Censuses.
30eﬀects are very similar in magnitude to those in Table (1), with the 1970-2000 sample based
estimates being larger in some instances and the 1980-2000 being larger in others. The key
conclusion, though, is that our results are not sensitive to the industry and city restrictions
imposed due to using our longer time period.
In Table (6), we provide estimates from our basic speciﬁcation run separately for each decade.
To save on space, we provide estimates using only OLS, IV1 and IV3. The estimated eﬀects
do diﬀer somewhat by decade. In particular, the β2 estimates are larger for the 1980-90
decade than the 1970-80 decade, but both are still substantial. The OLS and IV3 estimates
for the 1990-2000 are similar in size to those from the 1970-80 decade and, thus, indicate
that there continues to be substantial impacts from shifts in the composition toward higher
paying industries across time. However, the IV1 estimate for the most recent decade is very
poorly deﬁned and actually takes a negative sign. Underlying this is smaller variation in
∆Rct across cities in the 1990s, and a less good ﬁt is the ﬁrst stage regression.
We also consider two types of non-linearities in our estimation. First, our Rct measure is
a linear function of the national level wage premia. It seems possible, however, that an
increase in Rct stemming from gaining a very high wage industry might have a diﬀerential
impact relative to the same size increase generated from adding a larger industry which pays
a wage only slightly above the existing average wage in the city. In particular, adding a very
high wage industry may have greater salience in the thinking and bargaining of workers.
We address this possibility in Figure (3). To construct this ﬁgure, we divide industries into
thirds based on their associated, national level wage premia in 1970.19 In the top left panel
of the ﬁgure, we plot changes in average wages in the top third industries in each city against
the change in the share of employment in the top third industries. We also plot the simple
regression line through the cloud of observations. The regression line is strongly positively
sloped, with a slope coeﬃcient of 0.69 and an associated standard error of 0.08. This strong
impact of an increase in the share of employment in top industries is also seen in the bottom
left panel, which shows the relationship between the bottom third industry wage changes
and top third employment share changes. Thus, as emphasized in Figure (2), increasing
the share of employment in top paying industries has similar impacts across industries, but
Figure (3) makes it clearer that changing share in one part of the wage structure can aﬀect
wages in another part. The right two panels show the associations of wage changes with
changes in the share in the lowest third industries. The key point here is that changes in
19The results are not sensitive to using alternative base years to divide industries into thirds.
31this part of the structure produce strong negative impacts on wages. Thus, it is not the case
that our main results are being driven just by gains or losses within one subset of industries:
as the slope coeﬃcients shown in the ﬁgure demonstrate, changing average wages either by
gaining top paying industries or losing low paying industries has similar eﬀects.
We also investigated possible non-linearities in the impact of Rct on wages. In particular,
one might imagine that the marginal impact of adding one more high premium industry in
an already high-wage city is less than the impact of adding the same industry to a low-wage
city. In Table (7), we present estimates from our basic speciﬁcation but adding a squared
change in Rct term. The squared term enters statistically signiﬁcantly and with a positive
sign in all cases. In Figure (4), we plot the predicted proﬁles based on the OLS, IV1, IV2,
and IV3 estimates and actual changes in Rct from our sample.20 The plot indicates that the
estimated relationship is actually very close to linear in the relevant range in spite of the
signiﬁcance of the quadratic terms. This is particularly true for the IV estimates.21
6 Narrowing Down the Set of Explanations for the Ef-
fects of Changing Industrial Composition
To this point, we have established that shifts in industrial composition toward higher paying
sectors has an impact on wages in almost all industries, it holds up to corrections for endo-
geneity and sample selection, and it is not proxying for explanations for city growth based
on overall demand, diversity of the industrial structure, or changes in the education level of
the workforce. We are interested, now, in investigating what might underlie the estimated
eﬀect.
As a ﬁrst step, it is interesting to investigate the educational dimension of any response.
In particular, it would be useful to know whether “good job” impacts are located entirely
in the low education labor market. To examine this, we re-estimate our main speciﬁcation
separately for workers with a high school or less education and for workers with BA or
higher education.22 We create the national level wage premia, and thus the Rct measures,
20More speciﬁcally, to derive this plot, we estimate the regressions in Table 7 then set all coeﬃcients to
zero except for the Rct variables and the constant. We then predict values for the whole sample based only
on those coeﬃcients and plot them.
21 As an additional check, in Table (12) we report results obtained when using an hourly measures of
wages as our dependent variable, as opposed to an weekly measure. As can be seen, results are robust to
using either measure.
22The Rct measure is the same as that in earlier tables, i.e., it is constructed using industrial premia
32separately for each education group. We, again, estimate in two steps, with the ﬁrst step
individual wage regression (including Dahl’s selection correction) as well as the second step
run separately for the two education groups. The results from this exercise are presented
in Table (8). While the estimated β2 coeﬃcient varies slightly between those with a high
school education and those with a college education, the diﬀerences across education groups
are not large. Whatever we are measuring, it is not restricted to a subset of labour markets
deﬁned by skill.
One possible explanation for the patterns we observe is that while standard trade forces
are aﬀecting wages in tradeable goods sectors, wages associated with skills that are used in
the non-tradeable sector are moving for standard demand-induced reasons. Thus, a shift
in employment in a city toward having more workers with high levels of unobserved skills
(perhaps because of their pursuit of local amenities) could lead to an increase in Rct that
would not aﬀect wages in the tradeable sector for standard factor price equalization reasons
(under a standard Hecksher-Ohlin model) but, because the higher skilled workers have more
income to spend on locally produced non- traded goods, it could aﬀect wages in the non-
traded sector. Under this explanation, we should see smaller impacts of changes in Rct on
wages in tradeable sector industries than on wages in non-tradeable sector industries.
To deﬁne tradeable and non-tradeable sectors, we rely on an approach suggested in Jensen
and Kletzer [2005]. They argue that the share of output or employment in tradeable goods
should vary widely across regional entities (cities in our case) since diﬀerent cities will be
more heavily concentrated in producing diﬀerent goods which they can then trade. For non-
tradeable goods, on the other hand, assuming that preferences are the same across cities,
one should observe similar proportions of workers in their production across cities. We rank
industries by the variance of their employment shares across cities and call the industries in
the top third, high trade industries, those in the middle third, medium trade industries, and
those in the bottom third, low trade industries.23 In Table (9), we present estimates of our
basic model carried out separately for the low, medium and high trade industries. While the
estimated eﬀect of changes in Rct do tend to be slightly higher for the low trade industries,
the eﬀects for the medium and high trade industries continue to be strongly signiﬁcant and
of the same order of magnitude as the estimated eﬀects we obtained from the overall sample.
estimated for all workers in a regression including education, experience, gender, race and immigrant status
controls.
23The actual observations in the low trade industries is much lower than those in the medium and high
trade industries because the low trade industries tend to be small and so tend to be disproportionately
dropped when we impose our restriction that a given industry-city cell must contain at least 20 observations.
33Thus, our results do not appear as arising simply because of spill-overs into the non-traded
goods sector labour market. In Table (10) we also present results of estimating β for twelve
industry grouping. As can be seen, results are very similar across these industries, with
wages in manufacturing industries responding close to that observed for the overall sample.
This is further indication that the eﬀects do not seem concentrated in non-trade good sectors
since most manufactured goods are tradeable across cities.24
Another potential explanation for what we are measuring is that workers’ bargaining power
increases when the average wage premia in other industries goes up and that, as a result,
they are able to take rents away from quasi-ﬁxed factors. This would imply, for example,
that returns to capital should decline locally when better ﬁrms come to town. This diﬀers
from the explanation in our initial model in that we would not expect such eﬀects to persist:
essentially it should correspond to inducing a redistribution in the short run. Unfortunately,
we do not have data to examine this directly but we can get at it indirectly by estimating
using longer diﬀerences. The idea is that the quasi-ﬁxed factors should be able to readjust in
response to the wage increases over a 20 year horizon even if they cannot respond eﬀectively
within 10 years. In Table (11), we present results from estimating our base speciﬁcation
using 1970-1990 diﬀerences and 1980-2000 diﬀerences. The estimated composition eﬀects
are somewhat smaller in the 1970-90 case than in our 10 year diﬀerence results but they
still imply large and signiﬁcant eﬀects of nearly the same size as those seen in the 10 year
diﬀerence estimates. Thus, a simple redistribution story does not seem to be driving what
we ﬁnd.25
24Interestingly, the sector where wage exhibit the least response to change in Rct is public administration.
This may be due to the fact that wage for federal employees are generally set at the national level.
25The case of Pittsburgh over the period from 1980 to 2000 is a good example of the patterns we are ﬁnding
over both a ten year period and a 20 year period. During the period from 1980 to 1990, the average wage in
Pittsburgh fell by over 11% relative to the average wage across US cities. When we control for changes in
the educational attainment of the population, we obtain a similar fall in wages, indicating that educational
attainment in the Pittsburgh labour market resembled that of the nation. As is well known, Pittsburgh
has traditionally been highly concentrated in the steel industry, and during the 1980-90 period this industry
did very poorly. In large part due to these changes in the steel industry, our measure of labour market
rents for Pittsburgh, Rc,t, fell by 3.3% over the eighties relative to that experience by the average US city.
Hence, from a purely compositional view, changes in the fraction of high paying jobs in Pittsburgh appear
to account for a small fraction of the change in wages, leaving the majority of the fall ( 7.7%) unexplained.
Our results suggest that the pure compositional approach is invalid since it omits the spill-over eﬀects of
good jobs on wages in other industries. In contrast to the compositional view, our estimates of the eﬀect
of industrial composition indicate that virtually all the fall in wages in Pittsburgh over the eighties can be
attributable to the change in industry structure (3.5 x 3.3 = 11.5). Interestingly, we can then look beyond
the 1980-90 period to see whether wages in Pittsburgh reversed themselves. During the nineties, wages and
industrial composition changes fared much better for Pittsburgh. In terms of changes in the rent measure,
Rc,t, Pittsburgh experienced a change very close to the national average over the nineties. Accordingly,
the average wage growth was also much better, but it still did not surpass the national average (it was
34What, then, are we left with? The eﬀect we measure is not restricted to one educational
group, is present for tradeable goods and does not appear to be just a short term redistribu-
tion toward workers. The only way for these all to be true - for the eﬀect to be long lasting
even in tradeable goods markets - is if it is accompanied by an increase in productivity for
workers. The message of the model we presented at the outset is that models of the type
found in the recent heterogenous ﬁrm literature, with labour market frictions and ﬁrm het-
erogeneity, provide a potential explanation for how these productivity eﬀects can arise as a
market equilibrium. Further, as we argued earlier, the fact that we ﬁnd that our measured
eﬀects are the same whether we use variation from changes in the share of employment in
high wage industries or changes in the premia paid in high wage industries ﬁts with the type
of bargaining-based mechanism emphasized in the model.
6.1 Eﬀects of changes in industrial composition on the distribu-
tion of wages
In addition to the implications of industrial composition on average wages, the theory pre-
sented in section 2 also has implications for the distribution of wages. In particular, the
theory suggests that in a city that experiences a change in industrial composition towards
higher paying jobs, the improved bargaining position of workers should cause the least pro-
ductive ﬁrms to leave the market, thereby eliminating the lowest paying jobs. Workers are
then reallocated to the more productive jobs, leading to a decrease in wage inequality. We
explore this implication by examining the relationship between changes in industrial com-
position and changes in the diﬀerent deciles of the city level residual wage distribution. The
results are reported in Table (13) , where we again pool data for the three decade diﬀerences,
70-80, 80-90 and 90-00. The dependent variable is the change in the the residual wage decile
over a decade, where the wage residuals are obtained after regressing individual level wages
on our set of individual level variables discussed previously (age, schooling, gender,..) and a
full set of industry dummies. In contrast to our previous results, our dependent variable is
not observed at the city-industry level since many city-industry cells are too small to use in
an analysis of deciles. Instead, in this section, we rely on city level variation, controlling for
industry eﬀects by adding industry dummies in the ﬁrst stage.
approximately 2% below the national average). Hence, there is no indication that in the nineties Pittsburgh
experienced a reversal of the wage eﬀects experienced in the eighties; Pittsburgh simply experience a period
of growth similar to the rest of the country. This anecdote is consistent with the fact that we estimate similar
eﬀects of changes in industrial composition when we look over a 10 year period or a 20 year period.
35As can be seen in Table (13), the estimated impact of a change in Rct on the median wage is
very similar to the results in previous tables where we used the mean wage. The estimates
are close to 2.5 and highly signiﬁcant. The more interesting aspect to note is the pattern
of the coeﬃcients across deciles. For all four series of βs, the coeﬃcients are substantially
larger for the lower deciles than for the higher deciles, indicating that changes in Rct lead to
a wage distribution with lower inequality. For example, when we use IV1 as an instrument,
the estimated impact of a change in Rct on the 10th decile is more than twice the impact
on the 90th decile. Results based on IV3 shown even more compression. Although not
reported, we have veriﬁed the robustness of this pattern with respect to adding additional
regressors and dividing the sample into education sub-groups. In all these cases, we ﬁnd
that cities which experience a change in industrial composition in favor of better paying
jobs also experience a reduction in residual wage inequality, which is consistent with the
theoretical mechanism presented earlier. It is worth noting that most of the decrease in city
level inequality we observe is concentrated in the bottom half of the distribution, with the
50-10 decile diﬀerence declining by much more than the 90-50 decile diﬀerence in response
to a change in Rct. When we divide the sample between education groups, we ﬁnd the
compression eﬀects to be slightly greater for high school educated workers than for college
educated workers. Although such reduced inequality could be driven by several diﬀerent
mechanisms,26 the reallocation of workers across jobs with diﬀerent levels of productivity
oﬀers a simple interpretation.
6.2 Additional eﬀects associated with changes in industrial com-
position
Up to this point, our empirical investigation has focussed on evaluating how shifts in in-
dustrial composition toward high paying jobs aﬀects wages. In this subsection, we brieﬂy
explore the eﬀects of such a change on other city level outcomes. Given our interpretation of
the wage eﬀects, it would be natural to expect that a change in industrial composition that
favors high paying jobs should be associated with in-migration and potentially an increase in
the price of housing. In Table (14) we investigate this possibility. In the ﬁrst three columns
of the table, we examine whether changes in Rct are associated with increases in the price of
housing, as measured by the rent for one bedroom apartments. We again observe a positive
26 For example, in addition to the reallocation eﬀects emphasized by the model, improvements in worker
bargaining power could lead to within ﬁrm increases in productivity if ﬁrms are not always using the cost
minimizing technology.
36association, although it is less robust than that for weekly wages. It is worth noting that
while the estimated coeﬃcient on the change in Rct varies substantially across our diﬀerent
estimation strategies, in all three cases we ﬁnd that housing prices capitalize a large faction
of the changes in wages.27
It is interesting, in addition, to consider the eﬀect of changes in Rct on labor force growth,
as we do in the speciﬁcations in columns 10, 11 and 12 in Table (14). The results in these
columns show that a change in industrial composition in favor of high paying jobs has
a robust positive association with labor force growth. Together, the observations on the
eﬀects of shifts in industrial composition on labor force growth and housing costs suggest
that a city that experiences a positive increase in Rc,t becomes a more attractive city, as we
would expect given the impact in terms of higher average wages that we demonstrated in
the rest of the paper.
The model we presented in Section 2 focussed exclusively on the potential wage eﬀects
of changes in industrial composition. However, in models without ﬁrm heterogeneity, the
common adjustment mechanism associated with a change in industrial composition would be
through changes in the unemployment rate (or the employment rate). For example, a more
conventional adjustment mechanism associated with an increase in high paying jobs is an
increase in the fraction of individuals who choose to a queue for the better jobs. If such an
adjustment mechanism is present, we would expect an increase in Rc,t to be associated with
increases in a city’s unemployment rate, or a decrease in its employment rate. In columns 4-9
of Table (14), we explore the relevance of this alternative adjustment mechanism. We ﬁnd
very little evidence in support of the view that adjustments in queue lengths for goods jobs –
as measured by either changes in a city’s rate of unemployment or the rate of employment –
is an important equilibrium mechanism associated with a change in industrial composition.
Such a ﬁnding is quite surprising and is in sharp contrast with the wage eﬀect we have
documented. Together our ﬁndings, therefore, suggest that it is wages that adjust following
a change in outside options induced by a change in industrial composition, while almost none
of the adjustment takes the form of higher unemployment.
27 Since rents makes up only a fraction of total consumption, under perfect mobility of workers across
cities we would expect that the eﬀect of a change in Rct on housing prices would be greater than the eﬀect
on wages.
377 Conclusion
Policy forums often involve discussions of the eﬀects and desirability of attracting or retaining
jobs in high paying industries. In the popular press, it is common to hear statements claiming
that economic success is closely tied to favoring employment growth in sectors that pay high
wages for comparable individuals. In contrast, the most prevalent view among economic
researchers is that changes in industrial composition generally contribute very little to labor
market performance and therefore focussing on the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies with respect to
the creation or destruction of better paying jobs is likely misplaced. This consensus position
is based primarily on evaluating the economic impact of changes in industrial composition
using a simple accounting approach which assumes away spill-over eﬀects from the loss of
jobs in one sector to wages in other sectors. Although traditional economic theory provides
good reason to believe that such spill-over eﬀects should be absent or small, recent empirical
and theoretical developments emphasizing ﬁrm heterogeneity and labour market frictions
suggests a need to reexamine the issue.28 In this paper, we build on recent theory to highlight
an empirical strategy for evaluating the spill-over eﬀects of changes in job composition on
industry level wage payments. We implement that strategy using US census data from
1970 to 2000. Our main ﬁnding is that spill-overs appear pervasive, persistent and large.
In particular, at the city level we ﬁnd that having jobs more concentrated in high paying
industries has an eﬀect on the average wage within the city that is 2.5 to 4 times larger
than that implied by the common composition adjustment accounting approach. We show
that these results are robust to using diﬀerent instrumental variable strategies, controlling
for worker selection and focusing on sectors producing highly tradeable goods.
Our results suggest that policies or events which aﬀects industrial composition should not
be evaluated simply using the standard accounting approach but instead should explicitly
take account of substantial spill-over eﬀects. For example, it is common for opening up of
trade relationships to involve a reallocation of high and low paying jobs across trading part-
ners. Our results suggest that a proper evaluation of the eﬀects of increased trade needs to
incorporate the potential spill-over eﬀects on wages in other sectors. In general, recognizing
and quantifying these feedback eﬀects will lead to much more variable assessments of the
gains from trade since markets that attract high paying industries will beneﬁt more than
traditionally thought, while markets that lose such jobs should beneﬁt less.29
28The mechanism presented in Acemoglu [2001] provides an alternative rationale to explore such a issue.
29 Beaudry, Green and Collard [2005] and Beaudry and Collard [2006] ﬁnd that increased openness to
international trade over the period 1978-98 had vary uneven eﬀects across countries. In particular, countries
38that attracted high-capital-high-wage industries gained dis-proportionally relative to countries that increased
employment in low-capital intensive industries. The spill-over eﬀects found in this paper oﬀer a potential
explanation to the size of the eﬀects found in these two papers.
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42A Data Construction
The Census data was obtained with extractions done using the IPUMS system (see Ruggles
et al. [2004]. The ﬁles were the 1980 5% State (A Sample), 1990 State, and the 2000
5% Census PUMS. For 1970, Forms 1 and 2 were used for the Metro sample. The initial
extraction includes all individuals aged 20 - 65 not living in group quarters. All calculations
are made using the sample weights provided. For the 1970 data, we adjust the weights for
the fact that we combine two samples. We focus on the log of weekly wages, calculated by
dividing wage and salary income by annual weeks worked. We impute incomes for top coded
values by multiplying the top code value in each year by 1.5. Since top codes vary by State
in 1990 and 2000, we impose common top-code values of 140,000 in 1990 and 175,000 in
2000.
A consistent measure of education is not available for these Census years. We use indicators
based on the IPUMS recoded variable EDUCREC that computes comparable categories from
the 1980 Census data on years of school completed and later Census years that report
categorical schooling only. To calculate potential experience (age minus years of education
minus six), we assign group mean years of education from Table 5 in Park [1994] to the
categorical education values reported in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.
Census deﬁnitions of metropolitan areas are not comparable over time since, in general,
the geographic areas covered by them increase over time and their deﬁnitions are updated
to reﬂect this expansion. The deﬁnition of cities we use attempts to maximize geographic
comparability over time and roughly correspond to 1990 deﬁnitions of MSAs provided by
the US Oﬃce of Management and Budget.30 to create geographically consistent MSAs, we
follow a procedure based largely on Deaton and Lubotsky [2001] which uses the geographical
equivalency ﬁles for each year to assign individuals to MSAs or PMSAs based on FIPs state
and PUMA codes (in the case of 1990 and 2000) and county group codes (for 1970 and 1980).
Each MSA label we use is essentially deﬁned by the PUMAs it spans in 1990. Once we have
this information, the equivalency ﬁles dictate what counties to include in each city for the
other years. Since the 1970 county group deﬁnitions are much courser than those in later
years, the number of consistent cities we can create is dictated by the 1970 data. This process
results in our having 152 MSAs that are consistent across all our sample years. Code for
this exercise was generously provided by Ethan G. Lewis. Our deﬁnitions diﬀer slightly from
30See http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/pastmetro.html for details.
43those in Deaton and Lubotsky [2001] in order to improve the 1970-1980-1990-2000 match.
We use an industry coding that is consistent across Censuses and is based on the IPUMS
recoded variable IND1950, which recodes census industry codes to the 1950 deﬁnitions. This
generates 144 consistent industries.31 We have also replicated our results using data only
for the period 1980 to 2000, where we can use 1980 industry deﬁnitions to generate a larger
number of consistent industry categories.32 We are also able to deﬁne more (231) consistent
cities for that period.
B Implementing the Selection Estimator
As described in the paper, our main approach to addressing the issue of selection on un-
observables of workers across cities follows Dahl [2002]. Dahl argues that the error mean
term in equation (15) for person j can be expressed as a function of the full set of proba-
bilities that a person born in j’s state of birth would choose to live in each possible city in
the Census year. Further, he presents a suﬃciency assumption under which the error mean
term is a function only of the probability of the choice actually made by j. That suﬃciency
condition essentially says that two people with the same probability of choosing to live in a
given city have the same error mean term in their regression: knowing the diﬀerences in their
probabilities of choosing other options is not relevant for the size of the selection eﬀect in
the process determining the wage where they actually live. Dahl, in fact, presents evidence
that this assumption is overly restrictive and settles on a speciﬁcation in which the error
mean term is written as a function of the probability of making the migration choice actually
observed and the probability that the person stayed in their birth state.
Implementing Dahl’s selection correction approach requires two further decisions: how to
estimate the relevant migration probabilities and what function of those probabilities to use
as the error mean term. For the ﬁrst, Dahl proposes a non-parametric estimator in which
he divides individuals up into cells deﬁned by discrete categories for education, age, gender,
race and family status. He then uses the proportion of people within the cell that is relevant
31See http://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variableDescription.do?mnemonic=IND1950 for details.
32 The program used to convert 1990 codes to 1980 comparable codes is available at
http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats . That site is maintained by Barry Hirsch, Trin-
ity University and David Macpherson, Florida State University. Code to convert 2000
industry codes into 1990 codes was provided by Chris Wheeler and can be found at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/past/2006. See also a complete table of 2000-1990
industry crosswalks at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/indcswk2k.pdf
44for person j who actually made the move from j’s birth state to his destination and the
proportion who stayed in his birth state as the estimates of the two relevant probabilities.
This is a ﬂexible estimator which does not impose any assumptions about the distribution of
the errors in the processes determining the migration choice. For the second decision, Dahl
uses a series estimator to provide a non- parametric estimate of the error mean term as a
function of these probabilities.
We essentially implement Dahl’s approach in the same manner apart from several small
changes. First, we are examining the set of people who live in cities in the various Census
years but we only know the state, not the city of birth. We form probabilities of choosing
each city for people from each state of birth. People who live in a city in their state of
birth are classiﬁed as “stayers” and those observed in a city not in their state of birth are
classiﬁed as “movers”.33 We estimate the error mean term as a function of the probability
that a person born in j’s state of birth moved to j’s city of residence and the probability
that a person born in j’s state of birth still resided in that same state. Stayers have an error
mean term which is a function only of the probability that the person stayed in their state
of birth (since the probability of their actual choice and the probability of staying are one
and the same).
As in Dahl [2002], we estimate the relevant probabilities using the proportion of people within
cells deﬁned by observable characteristics who made the same move or who stayed in their
birth state. Similar to Dahl [2002], we deﬁne the cells using 4 education categories, 8 age
categories, gender and a black race dummy. For stayers, we also use extra dimensions based
on family status.34 This is possible because of the larger number of stayers than movers.
The full interaction of these various characteristics deﬁnes 80 possible person types for the
movers and 240 for stayers. For the movers in a particular city (i.e., for the set of people
born outside the city in which that city is situated), the probabilities will also diﬀer based
on where the person was born. Thus, identiﬁcation of the error mean term comes from the
assumption that where a person was born does not aﬀect the determination of their wage,
apart from through the error mean term. Intuitively, a person born in Pennsylvania has a
lower probability of being observed in Seattle than a person born in Oregon. If both are in
fact observed living in Seattle then we are assuming that the person from Pennsylvania must
have a larger Seattle speciﬁc “ability” (a stronger earnings related reason for being there)
33For cities that span more than one state, we call a person who is observed in a city that is at least partly
in their birth state a stayer.
34Speciﬁcally, we use single, married without children, and married with at least one child under age 5.
45and this is what is being captured when we include functions of the relevant functions of
being observed in Seattle for each of them. For stayers, we do not have this form of variation
and, hence, identiﬁcation arises from the restriction that family status aﬀects the decision
to stay in one’s state of birth but not (directly) the wage.
Our main diﬀerence relative to Dahl [2002] is that while he drops immigrants, we keep them
in our sample. We essentially treat them as if they are born in a diﬀerent state from the
city of residence except that we do not include a probability of their remaining in their place
of birth. We divide the rest of the world into 11 regions (or “states” of birth). As with
other movers, we divide them into cells based on the same education, age, gender and race
variables and assign them a probability of choosing their city of residence. Contrary to other
movers, however, we do not assign them the probability that immigrants from their region
of birth are observed in their own city in the current Census year. Instead, we assign them
the probability that a person with their same education was observed in their city in the
previous Census. This follows the type of ethnic enclave assumption used in several recent
papers on immigration, essentially using variation based on the observation that immigrants
from a particular region tend to migrate to cities where there are already communities of
people with their background.
Having obtained the estimated probabilities of following observed migration paths and of
staying in state of birth, we need to introduce ﬂexible functions of them into our regressions.
In practice, we introduce these functions in our ﬁrst estimation stage. The speciﬁc functions
we use are quadratics in the estimated probabilities. For movers born in the US, we introduce
a quadratic in the probability of moving to the actual city from the state of birth and a
quadratic in the probability of remaining in the state of birth. For stayers, we introduce
a quadratic in the probability of remaining in the state in general. For immigrants, we
introduce a quadratic in the probability that people from the same region and with the same
education chose the observed city. This represents a restriction on Dahl [2002], who allowed
for separate functions for each destination state. We, instead, assume the parameters in the
functions representing the error mean term are the same across all cities.
46Table 1: 1970-2000
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rc,t 2.622 2.690 2.604 1.843
(0.185)∗ (0.343)∗ (0.356)∗ (0.33)∗
Const. 0.287 0.297 0.285 0.175
(0.028)∗ (0.049)∗ (0.052)∗ (0.048)∗
Obs. 28142 28142 28142 28142
R2 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.534
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 2: 1970-2000
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rc,t 2.365 2.457 2.565 1.554
(0.178)∗ (0.32)∗ (0.346)∗ (0.38)∗
Const. 0.192 0.205 0.221 0.076
(0.028)∗ (0.047)∗ (0.052)∗ (0.056)
Obs. 28083 28083 28083 28083
R2 0.468 0.468 0.467 0.464
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49Table 5: 1980-2000: Alternative Sample
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rc,t 2.325 2.403 2.941 1.977
(0.276)∗ (0.277)∗ (0.441)∗ (0.217)∗
Const. -.135 -.133 -.124 -.141
(0.012)∗ (0.012)∗ (0.014)∗ (0.01)∗
Obs. 31268 31268 31268 31268
R2 0.596 0.596 0.594 0.595
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 6: Results by Decade
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
OLS IV1 IV3 OLS IV1 IV3 OlS IV1 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆Rc,t 1.639 3.290 2.308 3.050 3.057 3.200 2.499 -4.167 2.423
(0.258)∗ (1.667)∗ (0.307)∗ (0.308)∗ (0.352)∗ (0.353)∗ (0.429)∗ (2.785) (0.635)∗
Const. 0.216 0.45 0.311 -.122 -.122 -.120 0.134 -.008 0.132
(0.04)∗ (0.234) (0.045)∗ (0.013)∗ (0.013)∗ (0.013)∗ (0.012)∗ (0.062) (0.016)∗
Obs. 6391 6391 6391 10810 10810 10810 10941 10941 10941
R2 0.34 0.305 0.334 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.157 . 0.157
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
50Table 7: 1970-2000: Non-linear Speciﬁcation
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rc,t 3.152 2.806 3.626 2.402
(0.308)∗ (0.479)∗ (0.488)∗ (0.385)∗
(∆Rc,t)2 5.471 3.687 6.602 7.452
(1.439)∗ (5.098) (2.719)∗ (1.856)∗
Const. 0.19 0.178 0.235 0.041
(0.029)∗ (0.068)∗ (0.048)∗ (0.05)
Obs. 28083 28083 28083 28083
R2 0.47 0.469 0.469 0.464
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 8: 1970-2000: By Education Group
HS or < BA or >
OLS IV1 IV3 OLS IV1 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Rc,t 2.591 2.822 1.522 2.193 2.299 2.564
(0.193)∗ (0.345)∗ (0.41)∗ (0.258)∗ (0.435)∗ (0.528)∗
Const. 0.246 0.279 0.093 0.116 0.131 0.17
(0.03)∗ (0.05)∗ (0.06) (0.044)∗ (0.067) (0.081)∗
Obs. 21564 21564 21564 9233 9233 9233
R2 0.488 0.488 0.483 0.39 0.39 0.39
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 9: 1970-2000: By Trade and Non-Trade Industries
Low Trade Medium Trade High Trade
OLS IV1 IV3 OLS IV1 IV3 OLS IV1 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆Rc,t 2.614 2.970 1.973 2.171 2.487 1.964 2.376 2.352 1.296
(0.405)∗ (0.893)∗ (0.857)∗ (0.228)∗ (0.38)∗ (0.538)∗ (0.16)∗ (0.275)∗ (0.367)∗
Const. 0.299 0.11 -.039 0.153 0.199 0.101 0.197 0.193 0.042
(0.076)∗ (0.166) (0.17) (0.041)∗ (0.06)∗ (0.098) (0.025)∗ (0.041)∗ (0.054)
Obs. 4607 4607 4607 11680 11680 11680 11796 11796 11796
R2 0.444 0.444 0.443 0.415 0.415 0.415 0.53 0.53 0.523
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
51Table 10: 1970-2000: Breakdown by Industry Group
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing (Durables) 3.120 2.548 3.968 1.462
(0.196)∗ (0.368)∗ (0.374)∗ (0.482)∗
Manufacturing (Non-Durables) 2.471 2.240 2.620 1.809
(0.242)∗ (0.3349)∗ (0.423)∗ (0.415)∗
Public Administration 1.292 1.617 0.747 1.741
(0.210)∗ (0.398)∗ (0.339)∗ (0.464)∗
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.969 3.149 2.411 2.350
(0.267)∗ (0.475)∗ (0.505)∗ (0.514)∗
Professional 2.128 2.627 1.665 2.128
(0.194)∗ (0.365)∗ (0.358)∗ (0.408)∗
Financial, Real Estate, Insurace 2.208 3.007 2.057 1.211
(0.278)∗ (0.506)∗ (0.508)∗ (0.564)∗
Agriculture and Mining 2.850 2.557 3.258 2.167
(0.392)∗ (0.565)∗ (0.742)∗ (0.895)∗
Construction 3.398 3.717 2.542 2.558
(0.285)∗ (0.502)∗ (0.484)∗ (0.583)∗
Transportation and Utilities 2.171 2.246 2.179 1.963
(0.231)∗ (0.397)∗ (0.437)∗ (0.501)∗
Others (Private, Business, Entertainment) 3.050 3.558 2.180 3.186
(0.348)∗ (0.665)∗ (0.725)∗ (0.779)∗
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 11: 1970-2000: Long Diﬀerence
1970-1990 1980-2000
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Rc,t 1.222 2.007 7.392 1.987 1.944 2.373 2.681 2.251
(0.302)∗ (0.735)∗ (2.295)∗ (0.541)∗ (0.215)∗ (0.299)∗ (0.396)∗ (0.361)∗
Const. -.087 0.036 0.88 0.033 -.087 -.071 -.059 -.075
(0.054) (0.114) (0.357)∗ (0.086) (0.014)∗ (0.016)∗ (0.019)∗ (0.018)∗
Obs. 6268 6268 6268 6268 10302 10302 10302 10302
R2 0.202 0.197 . 0.198 0.272 0.269 0.263 0.27
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
52Table 12: 1970-2000: Hourly Wages
OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rc,t 2.351 2.433 2.332 1.634
(0.174)∗ (0.328)∗ (0.348)∗ (0.326)∗
Const. 0.48 0.492 0.478 0.377
(0.026)∗ (0.047)∗ (0.051)∗ (0.047)∗
Obs. 28143 28143 28143 28143
R2 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.639
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
industry and year dummies.
Table 13: 1970-2000: City Wage Deciles
Decile
Estimate (10) (20) (30) (40) (50) (60) (70) (80) (90)
OLS 3.812 3.395 2.976 2.703 2.487 2.364 2.293 2.197 2.136
(0.347)∗ (2.94)∗ (0.279)∗ (0.267)∗ (0.265)∗ (0.262)∗ (0.267)∗ (0.273)∗ (0.312)∗
IV1 5.059 4.283 3.631 3.245 2.966 2.806 2.743 2.649 2.656
(0.728)∗ (0.480)∗ (0.408)∗ (0.401)∗ (0.408)∗ (0.425)∗ (0.452)∗ (0.479)∗ (0.562)∗
IV2 2.294 2.475 2.365 2.268 2.156 2.126 2.136 2.090 2.100
(0.577)∗ (0.491)∗ (0.467)∗ (0.445)∗ (0.442)∗ (0.435)∗ (0.436)∗ (0.429)∗ (0.497)∗
IV3 5.060 3.944 3.095 2.564 2.168 1.859 1.660 1.404 1.205
(0.488)∗ (0.341)∗ (0.313)∗ (0.293)∗ (0.296)∗ (0.297)∗ (0.300)∗ (0.335)∗ (0.416)∗
Notes: Stars (*) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the year-city level. All regressions contain a full set of
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